This is an interpretative, critical, and selective review of scholarly contributions that explore Latin America’s religious landscape. We present data, both qualitative and quantitative, from Latin America and analyze the explanations given to make sense of it. After assessing the literature that uses either secularization theory or the “religious economy” approach, we study explanations that highlight a Latin American style of “popular religiosity.” These three models, in different ways, put the emphasis on religious institutions—their vitality, commands, competition, and authority. We (...) propose, instead, a focus on the religious practices of regular believers. We speculate that embarking from that focus, the idea of an “enchanted modernity” will help make sense of Latin America’s religious landscape. Nuanced elucidation of Latin America’s religious particularities will situate them in dialogue with other regions of the world, like western Europe and the United States, while also acknowledging the fact that Latin America is experiencing a modernization process distinct from the North Atlantic one. (shrink)

Imaginary is, in Taylor's thought, a category of understanding social praxis and the reasons people give to make sense of these practices. The ultimate reason is the hypergood, which influences the strong decisions. Those strong evaluations outline the moral framework from which people address their own lives and the lives of others. We only recognize our cultural framework as an `imaginary' — challenging the supposition it is something `objective' — when others make their apparition in our lives. After the encounter (...) nobody remains the same; something in our imaginary has changed. The outcome of this process is the `best account' we have to make sense of our life. If we accept the category of `imaginary' and the process of `best account' as accurate enough to address Latin American reality, the problem we have to solve is how we can find out a Latin American social imaginary. (shrink)

El libro que reseñaremos a continuación fue publicado en el año 2003 como primer número de la colección Thesys de la Editorial de la Universidad Católica de Córdoba, Argentina. Una pequeña nota en la contrasolapa nos informa que estamos, con esta colección, delante de “...una selección de obras de múltiples disciplinas, elaboradas a partir de los trabajos de Tesis de posgrado, presentadas y defendidas públicamente por docentes e investigadores de la U.C. de Córdoba., en distintas institucione..

This article shows why it is important to not "hastily condemn the condemnation of Gutiérrez by ecclesiastical authorities, [instead] we should learn from those censures". Then the essay shows why the last two Popes, John Paul the Great and Pope Bendict were sceptical of liberation theology. Nonetheless, this mode of theological praxis is now pervasive throughout global and Indian academia. The last part of this long essay contextualises how liberation theology has concetreley shaped the Indian Church and also, to an (...) extent, Hinduism. -/- . (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to provide a unitary typology for the incompatibilities of meanings at stake on different levels of Husserlian pure logic—namely, between systems of axioms and pure morphology of meanings; I show that they perfectly match by converging on the notion of Widersinn.

As a multi-layered theory of the foundations of “‘mathematicizing’ logic”, Husserlian pure logic is stratified on three levels (sub-theoretical, theoretical, meta-theoretical), which are then themselves transversally split in two sides (apophantic and ontological). This paper investigates how symbolic knowledge works in this framework—viz. in terms of ‘How can the subjective operating with symbols be justified in the process of obtaining objective contents of knowledge?’ To do so, it innovates in showing how Husserl’s theory of semiotic intentionality provides the epistemological-transcendental foundation (...) for the syntactic-semantic correspondence of the meaning relationship that is operative at the kernel of pure logic—i.e. on the theoretical level, between systems of axioms and formal manifolds. And thereby, it bridges the gap between the two volumes of the first edition of the Logical Investigations (namely, the Prolegomena and the six Investigations). (shrink)

This paper discusses the evolution of Husserl’s conception of judgement and propositional content from the lections on theory of meaning (1908) up to Ideen I (1913). It is shown that the conception of Ideen I, with the distinction between the complete noema and the noematic core, results from the fulfillment of tendences which are already present and active in Husserl’s earlier work. Along with the conception of Ideen I it is the problem of the modalities of judgement that becomes crucial, (...) from a systematical point of view. (shrink)

I present a discussion of some issues in the ontology of spacetime. After a characterisation of the controversies among relationists, substantivalists, eternalists, and presentists, I offer a new argument for rejecting presentism, the doctrine that only present objects exist. Then, I outline and defend a form of spacetime realism that I call event substantivalism. I propose an ontological theory for the emergence of spacetime from more basic entities. Finally, I argue that a relational theory of pre-geometric entities can give rise (...) to substantival spacetime in such a way that relationism and substantivalism are not necessarily opposed positions, but rather complementary. In an appendix I give axiomatic formulations of my ontological views. (shrink)

This submission explores the concept of aesthetic justice pedagogy, and advocates on behalf of it. In contrast to aesthetic injustice, which denotes any harm done to a person’s aesthetic capacities, aesthetic justice pedagogy aims at facilitating the development of students’ imagination, perception, and feelings, wherein narrative and story-making are prime locations to contest coloniality and oppression. We emphasize the practice of this philosophy, refusing to see it as only as metaphor or theory. In our attempt to build a praxis of (...) philosophy, education, and art, we lean upon diverse thinkers such as Augusto Boal, John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and Ursula K. Le Guin. We maintain that aesthetic justice pedagogy requires spaces of liberation whereby initiates can practice, rehearse, and perform new realities and create counter-narratives through various modalities of story-writing. Boal’s Aesthetics of the Oppressed, Dewey’s understanding of dramatic rehearsal, Freire’s work in Culture Circles, and Le Guin’s critique of the father tongue combine art, re-storying, and imagination in ways that are unique to the traditional practices of arts education. We conclude by reemphasizing the liberatory ways in which practice (aesthetic work that is done alone), rehearsal (art work with others), and performance (imagination’s accomplishment) come to identify unique qualities and practices of an aesthetic justice pedagogy. (shrink)

Several countries have implemented COVID-19 health passes or certificates to promote a safer return to in-person social activities. These passes have been proposed as a way to prove that someone has been vaccinated, has recovered from the disease, or has negative results on a diagnostic test. However, many people have questioned their ethical justification. This article presents some practical and ethical problems to consider in the event of wishing to implement these passes. Among the former, it is questioned how accurate (...) diagnostic tests are as a means of ensuring that a person is not contagious, whether vaccination guarantees immunity, the fact that health passes can be forged, whether they encourage vaccination, and the problem that there is no universally recognized health pass. Among the ethical issues, it is discussed whether health passes promote discrimination and inequality and whether they violate rights to privacy and freedom. It is concluded that health passes have enough ethical justification to be implemented. (shrink)

In this paper, we continue the study of the Łukasiewicz residuation algebras of order $n$ with Moisil possibility operators initiated by Figallo. More precisely, among other things, a method to determine the number of elements of the $MC_n$-algebra with a finite set of free generators is described. Applying this method, we find again the results obtained by Iturrioz and Monteiro and by Figallo for the case of Tarski algebras and $I\varDelta _{3}$-algebras, respectively.

The aim of this paper is to provide a reconstruction of Aristotle's discussion of incontinence, which stresses the relevant aspects from the point of view of a virtue ethics, focusing as a such not primarily on particular actions but on habitual dispositions of character. The paper emphasizes also the connection between Aristotle's account of incontinence and his conception of practical rationality, especially the issue concerning the temporal dimension of practical reason.

O presente trabalho trata de analisar a fala do famoso comediante grego Aristófanes, trazida por Platão em seu Simpósio. A fala da personagem aqui é interpretada considerando sua descrição da natureza humana a partir do famoso mito dos andróginos e as implicações do desejo (Eros) para a felicidade humana. Estranhamente, ao término da fala do comediante não há risos, provavelmente, porque o conteúdo falado foi um assunto sério que revelou a dimensão trágica de Eros para a vida humana.

This paper discusses the reception and the influence of the Critique of Judgement. It focuses on the central distinction between both fundamental types of functions in the Faculty of Judgement: the determinant and the reflexive function; it considers also its projection to the constitution of experience developed in the Critique of Pure Reason.

El artículo expone dos visiones acerca de la legitimidad del castigo en contextos de exclusión social. En la primera parte, uno de los autores defiende la idea de que los Estados que incumplen con obligaciones legales previas no pueden inculpar a quienes cometan delitos vinculados con ese incumplimiento. No pueden hacerlo porque no tienen el estatus moral para hacerlo de acuerdo a dos objeciones: la de complicidad y la de hipocresía. En la segunda parte, la segunda autora critica esta solución (...) al sostener que la falta de reciprocidad que caracteriza a la relación política vuelve inaplicables las objeciones de hipocresía y complicidad al ámbito del castigo penal estatal. (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce the variety of algebras, which we call monadic \-rough Heyting algebras. These algebras constitute an extension of monadic Heyting algebras and in \ case they coincide with monadic 3-valued Łukasiewicz–Moisil algebras. Our main interest is the characterization of simple and subdirectly irreducible monadic \-rough Heyting algebras. In order to this, an Esakia-style duality for these algebras is developed.

The thesis of this paper is that truth in politics is intersubjectively constituted within a set of relationships irreducible to the oppositions of truth and falsehood or veracity and lying. First, I examine the link between factual truth and politics, and argue that this sort of truth pervades our experience and tends to become background knowledge. Second, I propose a reading of Plato’s Apology according to which the truth in politics is grounded on an intersubjective normative and epistemological horizon, which (...) is vicariously communicated as gesture. Third, in relation to Plato’s Republic and Gorgias, I inquire about the semantic connections between fiction and lie and assert that the expression of the truth in politics requires a poetic endeavor, which blurs the lines separating veracity and lying. Finally, based on Agamben’s interpretation of Plato’s Hippias Minor, I conclude that the institution of the truth in politics requires diverse expressive and interpretive capacities. (shrink)

La idea de herencia extendida se ha transformado en un leitmotiv de lo que se ha dado en llamar ‘síntesis extendida’. Dicha idea, entretanto, lleva a ignorar una de las marcas distintivas de lo que clásicamente se ha entendido por transmisión hereditaria: su estrecha asociación con el proceso de reproducción. Sin considerar tal asociación, la noción de herencia, más que ampliarse, de hecho se disuelve; y aceptar esa disolución acarrearía demasiadas dificultades para el discurso de las ciencias biológicas. Una de (...) esas dificultades tiene que ver con el concepto de variación hereditaria. Con la disolución de la noción de herencia, ese concepto también se disolvería; y, sin éste, la Teoría de la Selección Natural no puede articularse. Pero, no habiendo motivos valederos para aceptar semejante costo teórico, aquí quiero mostrar que ambos conceptos, el de herencia y el de variación hereditaria, pueden y deben ser elucidados sin aceptar la idea de herencia ampliada. (shrink)

In this note I present a solution to Kripkenstein’s paradox, based on a very simple argument: (1) natural language and rule-following are empirical phenomena; (2) no case has been described, in real life, of a person who behaves as Wittgenstein’s or Kripke’s fictional character; (3) therefore, the discussion of such a case is completely devoid of interest. I lay out the example of a ‘Kripkensteinian apple’, which has a normal weight on even days and is weightless on odd days, in (...) order to highlight the contrast between a genuinely empirical perspective, such as that of physics, and the logical-analytical perspective, under which Kripkenstein’s paradox has attracted so much attention. (shrink)

La denominada 'estrategia del explanandum dual' ha sido utilizada en el pasado para enfrentar problemas de distinta clase, entre los que se cuentan el debate 'explicación vs. comprensión' y el problema de cómo las razones pueden explicar la conducta. Esta estrategia puede ser descripta someramente como un intento de resolver la rivalidad explicativa entre dos explicaciones por medio de la división del explanandum. En este artículo se analiza el uso que Ausonio Marras ha hecho de ella. Este autor ha sostenido (...) que su utilización permite enfrentar el problema de la ineficacia causal de las propiedades mentales, problema que ha representado una seria amenaza en las últimas dos décadas para el programa del materialismo no reduccionista. Se intentará mostrar que la estrategia sugerida no puede ser exitosa frente a este problema a menos que pueda proveerse de una explicación exitosa de cómo las propiedades mentales pueden mantener su eficacia causal completa, y que la respuesta que se ofrece no satisface esta exigencia. The dual explanandum strategy' has been used in the past to contend some quite different problems, including the 'explanation vs. understanding' debate and the problem of how reasons can explain behavior. This strategy can be roughly described as an intent to solve the explanatory rivalry between two explanations by means of the division of the explanandum. In this paper I want to analyze the use of this strategy by Ausonio Marras, who has claimed that it allows us to face the problem of causal inefficacy of mental properties. This problem has arisen in the last two decades in the context of non reductive materialism and has become a serious menace to this program. I try to show that this strategy can not work out this problem unless it can be provided with a successful account of the way that mental properties can keep their complete causal efficacy, and the answer he offers does not satisfy this demand. (shrink)

El autor procura presentar el pensamiento histórico del Inca Garcilaso, presedido por una nítida visión filosófica de índole platónico-agustiniana. Demuestra que fue el primer filósofo mestizo de América.

In this paper, I present a conception of meaning in natural language that I call the ‘process model’. According to this conception, meaning must be regarded as the result of a process of interaction in a community of cognitive-linguistic agents, with one another and with the environment. Drawing on this understanding, I argue that the study of meaning should no longer focus on logical analysis, but rather on an empirical perspective similar to the one in the other social sciences. I (...) briefly compare this view with semantic Platonism, as well as with Wittgenstein’s and Quine’s approaches to meaning. Finally, I outline a way in which this approach could be applied to two current problems in the philosophy of language: the treatment of linguistic vagueness and the definition of truth. The treatment of all these questions is very cursory, as a sort of travel guide for a future more detailed research. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the way in which we revise and change our beliefs is different from that in which we revise and change our judgments of value; this is due to the fact that judgments of value, unlike beliefs, have no truth-values. Changes of judgments of value do not answer in the same way to the restrictions that apply to changes of beliefs and that are determined by the norms that govern beliefs. I argue that, first when (...) we revise and change our beliefs, we should be in a position to suspend judgments, and when trying to remove doubts, we should try to avoid falsehood and, second when changing beliefs, we should be in a position to assign probabilities to those conjectures we are in suspense about. These two conditions apply to the case of changes of attitudes with truth-values, such as beliefs; I argue that these two characteristics do not apply to cases of changes of judgments of value.Neste artigo eu argumento que o modo pelo qual nós revisamos e mudamos nossas crenças é diferente daquele pelo qual revisamos e mudamos nossos juízos de valor; isto se dá porque juízos de valor, ao contrário de crenças, não possuem nenhum valor de verdade. Mudanças de juízos de valor não estão sujeitas às mesmas restrições que se aplicam às mudanças de crenças e que são determinadas pelas normas que governam estas. Eu argumento que, primeiro, quando revisamos e mudamos nossas crenças, nós deveríamos ser capazes de suspender juízos e, ao tentarmos suprimir dúvidas, deveríamos tentar evitar a falsidade e, segundo, ao mudarmos as crenças, nós deveríamos ser capazes de atribuir probabilidades àquelas conjecturas sobre as quais nós estamos em dúvida. Estas duas condições se aplicam aos casos de mudanças de atitudes com valores de verdade, tais como crenças; eu argumento que estas duas características não se aplicam aos casos de mudanças de juízos de valor. (shrink)

COVID-19 was recognized as a pandemic on March 11, 2020. Nine days later in Brazil, community transmission was deemed ongoing, and following what was already being put in place in various affected countries, restrictive and physical distancing measures that varied in severity across the different states were adopted. Adherence to restrictive and physical distancing measures depends on the general acceptance of public health measures as well as communities’ financial leverage. This article aims to explore and discuss ethical facilitators and barriers (...) to the implementation of physical distancing measures within three dimensions: political, socio-economic, and scientific. Furthermore, we would like to discuss ways to ethically promote restrictive and physical distancing measures in a large and unequal country like Brazil. There is an urgent need for transparent, consistent, and inclusive communication with the public, respecting the most vulnerable populations and attempting to minimize the disproportionate burden on them. (shrink)

En Vértigos argumentales, Carlos Pereda propone una clasificación de teorías fundacionistas sobre la justificación epistémica y sugiere que algo similar se puede hacer para la justificación práctica. Aquí desarrollo una clasificación de teorías acerca de la justificación moral en los mismos términos. Finalmente, analizo cómo sería lo que Pereda llama una teoría multifundacionista de la justificación en ética.

This article investigates if and how negotiators' self-efficacy beliefs affect their use of deception in negotiation. Specifically, we propose that self-efficacy can be interpreted as a threat to self-concept, which encourages individuals to temporarily bypass self-regulatory obstacles by morally disengaging their cognitive moral filters, thereby enabling them to use deception in negotiation. We test our hypotheses in three independent experimental studies involving an interactive negotiation simulation, totalizing 460 participants. We find that negotiators with low self-efficacy regarding their negotiation abilities are (...) more likely to use deception than those with high self-efficacy beliefs. Furthermore, we find that moral disengagement mediates the effects of self-efficacy on deception. Our findings suggest that self-efficacy plays a key role in shaping negotiators' ethical behaviors and we identify the psychological mechanism underlying this relationship. (shrink)

In this paper I draw a distinction between a special and a general version of the Gettier problem. I argue that the special problem is partially a logical problem, as well as an epistemological one, and I show that it is very easy to solve. This is interesting, since most of the Gettier-style examples that appear in the literature fall under the special problem, and hence as they stand they too are very easy to solve.

O presente artigo visa dar continuidade ao debate levantado no livro Razão Mínima, no qual diversos autores abordam o papel da razão a partir das críticas céticas. A partir de uma explicação do papel das crenças no ceticismo pirrônico, pretende-se analisar qual conceito de razão e de ciência poderiam sobreviver a tais críticas. Será defendida, então, uma visão comunitária de razão e ciência. Nela, o que consideramos racional só pode ser entendido a partir de uma perspectiva coletiva e tipicamente humana.